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FOR RElEASE
SUl'IDAY A. M.'S
April 13, 1969
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTA~TA)
A HOLD-FAST ON MISSILE

DEPLOYME~fl

After several years of relative s t ability, the Soviet Union and the
United States are on the verge of major additional deplovments of nuclear
missiles.

The pressure to proceed with the installation of these nevr sys t ems

is on in this nation and the indications are that it is on in the Soviet Union.
It is on despite the fact that each nation can ill-afford the enormous expenditures of these deployments in the light of other national needs.

It is on

even though, for years, both nations have urged arms limitations as the
better way to national security than the continuance of this appalling
missile merry-go-round .
It should be noted, therefore, that during the last months of the
Johnson Administration and the first months of the present Administration
the Soviet Union apparentl;r made thr ee overtures which suggested a willingness
to sit down and discuss a limitation on armaments of various types.

In a

similar vein, President Nixon has stated that he wants to replace the era
of "confrontation" with the era of negotiations."

He has made clear that

he would prefer the "open-hand" to t he "closed fist" in t he relationship
of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Based on

Secreta~'

Rogers' press conference of April 7, I assume

that Soviet probings for talks on armaments have received full consideration
in the Executive Branch.

It vrould be my hope that the President,on that

basis and on the basis of the preparat ions which he has made since taking
office , would now be ready to set a date c e rtain to open U. s.-Soviet
discussions.
I am not suggesting tha c. armaments negotiations should be "linked"
with a consideration of political differences and t he host of ot her issues
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which have separated the United States and the Soviet Union for many years.
Panoramic negotiations of that kind may or may not be fruitful at some point
in the future.

In my view, however, first thing; should come firs t .

The first thing, in my judgment, is not to be found in the political
issues of many years standing.

Nor is the first thing to be found in arms

reduction in a general sense which has been under discussion for two decades.
Rather, the most urgent need is to curb the rising pressure in both count ries
for another major intensification of the deadly nuclear weapons confront ation .
The time to respond to Soviet overtures for talks or to take th e
initiative ourselves should be before not after the deployment of new nuclear
weapons systems , for which the gears are now turning} has gained irreversible
momentum in both countries.

What is needed before all else are U.

s.~soviet

negotiations which, confined to one question, may act to halt these gears
promptly.

What is needed, now, in my judgment, is the negotiation of an a gr ee

ment to hold-fast on the further deployment of nuclear weapons in the Soviet
Union and the United States .
If agreement on that single point can be achieved there would be
created a climate of calm, as in the case of t he aftermath of the Test Ban
Treaty , which might help to

brin ~

about solutions of mutual interest to the

more complex problems of arms-reduct ion as well as the resolution of poli t ical differences.

At the least, the immediate result of an agreement to

hold-fast on further nuclear deployments would be an irr:mens e savings of
resources which would otherwise be diverted into new weapons s ys tems in both
countries over the next few years.

Any initiat ive by the President

in this

connection, in rn:v judgment, would be gratefully received, not only bv the
peoples concerned but b y the peoples of t he world.
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retary of Defc1 , Mr. Laird, for not appearing before the Republican National
Committee today to discuss the question
of the ABM.
I wish to express my concern about
reports I have read In the newspapers to
the effect that the Democratic National
Committee has Indicated that the question of the ABM might become a part!·
san Issue.
I also want to express my concern
about Republican attempts to make It a
partisan Issue on the basis of pressures
which I understand-but cannot prove-have been In operation during the past
several days.
Furthermore, I also wish to express my
concern about any Democrat in this
Chamber who attempts to make the
ABM a partisan polltloa.lissue.
I am also concerned with committees
being set up either !or or against the
ABM and being allied with either party.
I think they should go their own way,
make their own case. The Senate will
make up Its own mind, .either !or or
agadnst.
I commend the President, 1! a report
which I have heard 1s accurate -on the
statement, attributed to the White House,
that he contemplates appearing before
the Nation in defense of his proposal for
a Safeguard missile system. That Is
within the area of his responsibllitymake his case, so to speak. But the point
I emphasize above all else is thM; this 1s
not a Republican issue or a Democratic
Issue. It 1s a national issue which supersedes the interests of both parties. It Is
an issue which has two sides. There are
meritorious arguments on both-let them
be heard In the Senate.
In recent years many Issues of foreign relations and military peltcy have
come before the Senate. That these questions have been considered In an atmosphere free of partisan political consideration reflects great credit on Senators
of both parties.
I have no hesitancy 1n this connection
1n acknowledging a debt to the distinguished minority leader <Mr. DIRKSEN)
and to the entire Republican membership. During the K ennedy and the Johnson administrations, there was no Inclination on their part to play pelitlcs
with the Nation's security. Equally, there
w1ll be no lncllnatlon on the part of the
majority leadership to play pelttlcs with
these issues during the current adminlstrM;!on.
That Is not to say that there will not
be differences. There are already dlf.
ferences even as there were di~rences
during the past two administrations.
The differences, however, wlll cut across
party lines, now, even as they did then.
That 1s to be expected when complex
questions confront the l3enate. That 1s
as It should be when these questions are
examined In the context of the variety
of Insights and attitudes which exist 1n
the Senate.
The treatment of Vietnam during the
last administration Ulustrates this point.
The Senate will recall that policies of
the Kennedy and Johnson administraTHE ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE
tions on VIetnam were disputed, 1n the
SYSTEM
first Instance, by Democratic Senators,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I by members of the Democratic majority.
wish to commend the dlstl.ngulshed Sec- My own views of disagreement with these
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policies are well known because they were
expressed publicly 1\Jld, In prtvate, to both
President Kennedy and President Johnson. Clearly, there was no element of
politics !nvolvN.I In Democmtlc Senators
assuming positions of Oi>poslt!on to a
Democratic administration.
Distinguished Republ!can Senators,
however, also formed a most articulate
and perceptive segment of the opposition to the spread of the VIetnamese violence during the previous administration.
To be sure, the opposition of these Republican Senators was directed at 8
Democratic administration. They acted,
however, not out of partisanship but on
the basis of their high constitutional
responsibilities. In my judgment, those
Republican Senators deserve not partisan labels but national thanks for their
contrtbut!on to preventing the compounding of the tragic conflict in Vietnam.
In the same fashion, the crttlcal examination of the ABM issue has also
transcended party lines. The opposition
to this Immensely costly and questionable military undertaking did not begin
on January 20 with a Republican administration. Rather, the opposition had already reached significant expressionperhaps over 40 percent of the Senatein the last session of the Congress.
There were Democratic Senators, then,
who voted their convictions that the Deepartment of Defense was moving Into
dubious grounds with the ABM proposal.
There were Democrats, then, who felt
and so stated-the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), for _
example--that we would r!sk enormous
tax funds for what, at the very best,
would prove an unnecessary piling up of
useless military hardware.
In this instance, too, as 1n the case
of Vietnam, voices of opposition were
raised on the Republican side of the
aisle. Indeed, the Initiative which served
to marshal the opp-osition to the ABM
came largely from the perceptive and
articulate arguments of the Senator from
Kentucky (Mr. COOPER ) .
Why did this distinguished Republican
speak out? Did he speak as 8 Republican
to embarrass a Democratic ad.m1nistratlon? Or did he speak as 8 Senator of
conscience and conviction? Did the Senator from Kentucky speak as 8 partisan
politlc:lan or as a former diplomat with
an Immense knowledge of world affairs?
And did the distinguished Senator from
Maine <Mrs. SMITH), the ra.nklng member of the minority of the Armed Services
Committee, in opposing this project last
year, speak as a partisan politician? Or
did she speak as one of the Senate's
ablest experts In mllitary matters, with
a far longer experience 1n the problems
of nuclear weaponry than most of the
Defense Department officials who were
urging the ABM?
I need not labor the point. I make the
point only to underscore the total absence of partisanship, heretofore, In the
consideration of the issue of the ABM.
I make It only because of disturbing repOrts of outside efforts to synthesize a
political partisanship where, In fact,
none has existed and where none should
exist.
We were, none of us, born yesterday,
We are, none of us, stra~ers to the more
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devious byways of the world of politics.
But the attempt to bring political considerations into this issue by the backdoor of the Senate is not trivial and it
is most inexcusable.
What is at stake, here, is not the political popularity of this administration
anymore than its predecessor. What is at
stake here, in the end, are billions of
dollars of funds-expenditures which
have been proposed by the Defense Department under consecutive administrations. These are public funds which we
can 111 afford to waste on superftous impractical or irrelevant defenses at a time
when in.fl.ation and taxes and urgent civil
demands are pressing heavily upon the
people of the United States.
What is sounding in the ABM question
is not the clarion call to politics in 1970
or 1972. It is, rather, the call to face
clearly ln the Senate the issues of peace
and war-to consider deeply what may
contribute to the strengthening of peace
and what may intensify the prospect of
war.
That 1s what confronts us, I do not
know how the Senate will decide this
issue. I am confident, however, that
Senators of both- parties will dismiss
from the consideration of the issue this
patent attempt to intrude an extraneous
politics into the constitutional responsibility which devolves upon each Senator
regardless of his views.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield, 1f I have
time remaining.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 5 minutes.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without obl_ectlon, the Senator from Kentucky is
recognized !or 5 minutes.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank
Senator MANSFIELD for his very generous
remarks. But I must say that the effort
1n the Senate to bring before the Congress and the country the merits of the
proposed ABM system has been led and
shared by many on both sides of the
&isle, and certa.inly the le9.dersh1p and
moral force of the majority leader bas
been in my view a most important
factor.
I share his viewpoint that the ABM
issue should be removed from the arena
of pa.rt1sa.n politics, as far as it 1s poosible. I say-as far as possible-because of
public tnterest in issues and 1n political
personalltles make it imP068ible that a
deba.te 6\lCh as this will be caiTied on
whol:ly apart from political consideration. And beyond the partisan politics,
the Executive, as well as Members of
the Congress who oppose ,,.., 1 support
this system, has the right
' the duty
to the coWltry to call for "'lpport.
But I would caution the na.tlonal
committees and political organizations,
whether of the Republican or Democratic Party, not to appeal for support or oppooition to the system because of party
or support of individuals. A:; Members of
the Congress deeply concerned about
this issue which affects our country
seek to make their decision, partisan
efforts do not help and 1n my judgment
wlli backfire.
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This debate lnvol L the question of
national security, which no responsible
person of either party would want to
compromise. Beyond the question of
whether deployment against some sudden or immediate danger which in my
view has not been satisfied, Is the larger
issue of determining the elements of security in a wo!"ld of nuclear weapons
and the question of deployment concerns
its effect on negotiations with the Soviet Union on control of nuclear weapons, for which the President is striving.
The question of whether such arrangements are possible is always a doubtful
one. but the very nature of our system
of government demands always that we
make the effort. A sensible ground upon
which we can expect an opportunity to
reach such an accord is that our interests in this case are mutual. The Soviets
are unpredlcable, but like the United
States we cannot consider that they want
to be destroyed.
We must consider the effect of the
continued escalation of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons. Wlll their continued development cause the balance of
tenor to beco!Ile an imbalance of tenor
with increased danger that one natior
may try a preemptive strike? This condition would create a sense of fear, and
certainly a sense of futility, particularly
among the young people of our country
who would like to live their lives in a
peaceful world, at least relatively peaceful, and one not overhung by the threat
of a nuclear race and a nuclear war. I
do not suppose that any of us, young or
old, want a nuclear weapons system
hanging over us--and to live in mind 1f
not in fact, like our ancient ancestors in
caves. It may be there is no other way,
but I am constrained to believe that reason can prevail.
When Senator HART, of Michigan, and
I introduced an amendment last year to
postpone the deployment of the ABM
system, joined by Members of the Senate, both Republicans and Democrats,
we did so that the Senate, the Congress
and the country would have the chance
to fully examine its merits and the
necessity of its deployment. Throughout
last year as Senator HART and I persisted ln the submission of amendments,
joined always by a bipartisan group and
as others Introduced amendments-senator YOUNG of Ohio, Senator NELSON of
Wisconsin, Senator CLARK of Pennsylvania-continuing debate had the effect
we had desired-submission of the issue
on its merits to the country.
The debate has brought forward many
versions of the purpose of the systemwhether against a Chinese or Soviet
threat, whether to protect our missile
sites, whether for a mixed population and
missile site protection, or whether to
strengthen the hand of our country In
negotiations with the Soviet Union. Each
of these purposes has been questioned at
times both by proponents and opponents.
But the debate has been upon the
merits and not upon partisan grounds.
The elected leadership of both the majority and the minority a nd other Members of the Senate have taken their positions on the mel1ts and some are opponents and some are proponents of the
system.

S3635

I hope this Is the way it will oontinue
and that the decision In the Congress
wm be made upon the merits. I continue
to hope that the President will establish
a committee such as Dr Killian recommended, which working with the executive branch will provide the best Judgment of the best informed minds of our
country upon the issue. and that a judgment wlll result which would have the
support of the great maJority, perhape
an overwhelming majority, of our people.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will
call the roJl.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.
EAGLETON in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.
MISSILE DEPLOYMENT
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as
long as no Senator seems to be endeavoring to get recognition at this time, I
should like to read a statement which I
made on Saturday, so that It will be a
part of the record of my position on the
ABM:
A HOLD-FAST ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

After several years o! relative stability, the
Soviet Union and the United States are on
the verge ol major a.ddltlona.l deployments
ol nuclear mlslllles. The proosure to proceed
wl th the Install a. tlon or these new sys terns
Ill on ln this nation and the Indications are
that lt Is on In the Soviet Union. It Is on
despite the fact that ea<:h nation can Illafford the enormous expPndltures ol these
deployments in the light or other national
needs. It 1B on even though, lor years, both
nations have urged ariJlJ! limitations as the
better way to national security than the
continuance ot this appalling missile merrygo-round.
It should be noted therefore, that during
the last months of the Joh.nSon Administration a.nd the tl.rst month.• or the present
Admlnistratlon the Soviet Union apparently
made three overtures which suggested a willIngness to slt down and discuss a limitation
on armaments of various types. In a similar
vein, President Nlron has ttated that he
wants to replace the era ol "conrrontatlon"'
with the era ol "n('gotlatlons." He has made
clea.r that he would prefer the "open-hand"'
to the "cloeed fist" In the relationship of the
United States and the Soviet Union.
Based on Secretary Roger~· press conference of April 7, I assume that Soviet probings
for talks on armaments t.ave received full
consideration In the Executive Branch.
I quote !rom that pr•ss conference, at
which time Secretary ol State Rogers WM
asked whether there was anything standing
In the way o! the s trategic arms limitation
talks. He gave this answer· "No. there Is
nothing that stands In the way and they
can go rorwnrd very soon. We are In the process or preparing for them now and we expect
they will begin In the late spring or early
summer."
It would be my hope that the President. on
that ba.sla and on the ba..• ls ol the preparations which he has made since taking omce,
would now be ready to set a date certain to
open U .S.-Sovlet discussions.
I am not suggesting that armaments negotiations should be "linked" with a consldera-
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tton of polltlce.I d1tferences e.nd. the hoot o!
other Issues which have separated the United
States and the SOviet Union tor many yeara.
Panoramic negottatton.o of that klnd may or
may not be trutttul at some polnt 1n the
future. In my view, however, first th.lnga
ehouM come first.
The finlt thing, 1n my judgment, Is not to
be found 1n the political l.ssues of many years
Btandlng. Nor Is the first thing to be found
1n arms reduction 1n a general sense which
haB been under dtaCUsslon tot: two decades.
Rather. the most urgent need 1s to curb the
r1s1ng pressure 1n both countries tor another
major 1ntensl11catlon of the deadly nuclear
weapons confrontation.
The time to respond to Soviet overtures
for talks or to take the lnltlatlve ourselves
Bh<>uld be before not after the deployment
o! new nuclear weapons systems, !or which
the gears are now turning, has ge.Ined Irreversible momentum 1n both countries.
Whst is needed before all else are U.S.-Boviet
negotiations which. confined to one qeustlon,
may act to halt these gears promptly. What
ls needed, now, In my judgment, Is the negotiation of an agreement to hold-fast on the
further deployment of nuclear weapons 1n
the Soviet Union and the United States.
I1' agreement on that slngle 'polnt can be
acllleved there would be created a climate of
calm, a.s 1n the case of the atterm.ath of the
Test Ba.n Treaty, which might help to bring
about solutions of mutual interest to the
mO!'e complex problems ot arms-reduction as
well sa the resolution of po!ltlcal d1fference11.
At the least, the Immediate result o! an
agreement to hold-fast on further nuclear
deployments would be an Immense savings
ot resources which would otherwise be diverted lnto new weapons systems 1n bot h
countries over the next few years. Any Initiative by the President 1n th1s connection, ln
my Judgment, would be gratefully received,
nat only by the peoples concerned but by t~
peoples o! the world.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
w1ll call thc roll
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
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